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Antitrust Injury and Standing: A Question
of Legal Cause
Since the Supreme Court introduced the concept of "anti-
trust injury" in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., I
no general agreement has evolved regarding the kinds of inju-
ries encompassed within its scope. The Brunswick Court
adopted the concept to identify those losses for which antitrust
damages may be awarded. Because courts have recognized
that they can often make this judgment at the outset of a case,
they have begun to incorporate the concept of antitrust injury
into the standing requirement for private antitrust suits to
avoid unnecessary inquiries into liability when no cognizable
damages have been alleged.2 The Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Blue Shield v. McCready3 confirms that antitrust injury
will be an essential element of standing to maintain a treble
damage action under section 4 of the Clayton Act,4 yet demon-
1. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
2. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1235 (6th Cir.)
("If the failure to prove cognizable damages requires a judgment for the de-
fendant notwithstanding the verdict,. . . it follows that a failure to allege cogni-
zable damages compels the dismissal of the complaint."), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
893 (1981). For further cases requiring antitrust injury as a prerequisite to
standing, see General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 681 F.2d 594,
596-97 (9th Cir. 1982) (only element of standing required was that plaintiff sat-
isfy antitrust injury); Solinger v. A&M Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304, 1310 (9th Cir.
1978) (antitrust injury is an issue of causation; causation is an element of
standing; and target area test is used to determine whether the plaintiff has sat-
isfied the causation element), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979); Donovan Constr.
Co. v. Florida TeL Corp., 564 F.2d 1191, 1192 (5th Cir. 1977) (antitrust injury doc-
trine is satisfied by traditional target area standing test), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1007 (1978); Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank, 445 F. Supp.
965, 970-71 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (to satisfy traditional target area standing test,
plaintiff must allege antitrust injury), affld, 624 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1013 (1980). See also Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d 514, 516-17
(7th Cir. 1982) (former employee who claimed his dismissal resulted from fail-
ure to cooperate in price fixing scheme was not in target area of alleged con-
spiracy and thus did not suffer antitrust injury); John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia
Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 1977) (beer distributor who lost Hamm's
account after merger of Hamm's and Olympia did not suffer the type of anti-
trust injury Congress meant to prevent with § 7 of Clayton Act).
3. 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).
4. Id. at 2551. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in part-
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any dis-
trict court of the United States ... and shall recover threefold the
1011
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
strates the lack of consensus over what will constitute antitrust
injury in any particular case.
In Brunswick, the Court defined antitrust injury as "injury
of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that
flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." 5 It is
not clear, however, what injuries the antitrust laws were in-
tended to prevent or from what aspect of defendant's conduct
the injury must flow. Consequently, the Brunswick formula-
tion has been difficult to apply. This Note attempts to provide a
framework for determining whether a particular loss is anti-
trust injury by adopting a proximate cause test developed for
determining liability in negligence cases. Part I traces the de-
velopment of antitrust standing law in general and the antitrust
injury doctrine in particular. Part II examines judicial efforts at
defining antitrust injury and the economic efficiency purpose of
the antitrust laws. It then explores an approach to antitrust in-
jury based on the concept of legal cause used in tort law. Part
HI discusses the limits of the antitrust injury concept in stand-
ing analysis under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTITRUST
STANDING DOCTRINE
A. THE TRADITIONAL STANDING TESTS
Treble damages in the antitrust laws have a threefold pur-
pose: to compensate injured parties,6 to punish and deter anti-
damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
5. 429 U.S. at 489.
6. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-
86 (1977) ("[T]he treble-damages provision... is designed primarily as a rem-
edy."). The legislative history of § 7 of the Sherman Act, the predecessor to § 4
of the Clayton Act, also reveals that Congress intended the treble damages pro-
vision to be broadly remedial. In response to Senator George's attack on the
constitutionality of the Sherman Act, Senator Sherman argued:
He [Sen. George] treats this bill as a criminal statute from beginning
to end, and not as a remedial statute with civil remedies .... He
treats this bill very much as he does the Constitution of the United
States, something to be evaded, to be strictly construed, instead of be-
ing what it is, a remedial statute, a bill of rights, a charter of lib-
erty.... Now, Mr. President, what is this bill? A remedial statute to
enforce by civil process.., the common law against monopolies. How
is such a law to be construed? Liberally with a view to promote its
objects.
21 CONG. REc. 2461 (1890). Several legislators perceived this remedy as primar-
ily for the benefit of consumers. Early in the debates concerning the proposed
Sherman Act, when it contained only a double damages provision, Senator
George notech
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trust violators,7 and to encourage private enforcement of the
antitrust laws. 8 Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits recovery of
The consumer, therefore, paying all the increased price advanced by
the middlemen and profits on the same, is the party necessarily damni-
fled or injured.
Who are the consumers? The people of the United States as indi-
viduals; whatever each individual consumes, or his family, marks the
amount of his interest in the price advanced by the combination.
Id. at 1767-68. And Senator Coke argued that the proposed bill providing only
double damages would leave "the consumers of products which are raised and
manufactured in this country... without a remedy." Id. at 2615. See also id.
at 3146-47 (remarks of Sen. Reagan); id. at 2612 (remarks of Sens. Reagan and
Teller).
When Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914, it extended the treble dam-
ages remedy to cover injuries caused by violations of all the substantive anti-
trust laws and also provided a more liberal venue rule. Representative Webb,
explaining the bill as it was reported out of the Judiciary Committee, remarked
that the civil remedy "opens the door of justice to every man, whenever he may
be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws, and gives the injured party
ample damages for the wrong suffered." 51 CONG. REc. 9073 (1914). See also id.
at 9489 (remarks of Rep. Floyd); id. at 9270 (remarks of Rep. Carlin); id. at 9079
(remarks of Rep. Volstead) (Section 4 "may add quite a little to the remedy
which private parties have in securing relief where they have been oppressed
by unfair methods of competition.").
7. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639
(1981) ("The very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and
to deter future, unlawful conduct ... ."); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 746 (1977) (One of the purposes of § 4 is "deterring violators and depriving
them of 'the fruits of their illegality.' ") (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968)). See also Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S.
308, 314 (1978) (purposes of § 4 are to deter violators and to compensate vic-
tims); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969)
(purpose of treble damage remedy is to promote private enforcement of anti-
trust laws); Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139
(1968) (purpose of § 4 is to deter those contemplating antitrust violations).
The legislative history also reveals that Congress designed § 4 to provide
"teeth" for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws because treble damages
"will have a more deterrent effect.., than a mere criminal penalty." 51 CONG.
REc. 16,274 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb).
8. Before the Sherman Act version was finally settled upon, Senator
Sherman argued that "damages should be commensurate with the difficulty of
maintaining a private suit against a combination such as is described." 21
CONG. REC. 2456 (1890). Several senators spoke alternatively of the remedial
and enforcement objectives of the treble damages provision. See, e.g., 21 CONG.
REc. at 2456, 2461 (1890) (Sen. Sherman); id. at 2615 (Sen. Coke); id. at 3146
(Sen. Hoar); id& at 3147 (Sen. George). Some commentators have concluded
that various circumstances suggest that Congress's primary purpose in enact-
ing the original treble damages provision was to provide an efficient enforce-
ment device. See, e.g., W. HAAILTON & I. TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION 10 (1941)
("A man knew when he was hurt better than an agency or government above
could tell him. Make it worth their while-as the triple-damage clause was in-
tended to do-and injured members could be depended upon to police an in-
dustry."); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTrRUST POLICY 225 (1954) (suggesting
that Congress's intent to largely codify the common law indicates reliance by
Congress on the self-enforcement capabilities of private suits.); Page, Antitrust
Damages and Economic Eficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. Cm.
L REV. 467, 473 (1980) ("One can conclude that [Congress] expected the stat-
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treble damages by "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the an-
titrust laws."9 Read literally, section 4 appears to confer a right
to treble damages on any plaintiff who could establish that a
defendant's violation of the antitrust laws was a cause in fact of
some injury to the plaintiff's "business or property."1o Because
the typical antitrust violation sends a "ripple effect" through
the economy injuring untold numbers of potential plaintiffs,"
the federal courts have limited the availability of the treble
damage remedy by grafting a standing requirement onto sec-
tion 4.12
The courts justify imposing a standing requirement on
plaintiffs as necessary to prevent duplicative or windfall recov-
eries by plaintiffs,13 to avoid imposition of ruinous financial ob-
ligations on defendants, 4 and to ease the administrative
ute to deter anticompetitive conduct rather than systematically make whole
those who had been injured by past inefficiency."); Tyler, Private Antitrust Liti-
gation: The Problem of Standing, 49 U. CoLO. L. REV. 269, 281 (1978) (conclud-
ing that the goal of private enforcement must have been most important to
Congress because it did not fund governmental enforcement or provide an en-
forcement agency for 13 years after passage of the Sherman Act).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
10. See Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Stand-
ing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 810 (1977); Lytle & Purdue, Antitrust Target Area Under
Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Determination of Standing in Light of the Alleged
Antitrust Violation, 25 Am. U.L. REV. 795, 796-98 (1976).
11. For instance, if several manufacturers conspire to exclude another
manufacturer and cartelize an industry, the immediate injury is suffered by the
excluded manufacturer. This will result in injury to the excluded manufac-
turer's suppliers, distributors, employees, and other business associates. The
monetary loss to those parties will in turn be partially passed on to their land-
lords, suppliers, creditors, and other business associates. Various levels of gov-
ernment will suffer in the form of increased expenditures for unemployment
compensation and lost sales tax and income tax revenues. Another similar rip-
ple will flow from the reduced supply and increased price to consumers of the
cartelized product. See Lytle & Purdue, supra note 10, at 796-98.
The potential injuries from antitrust violations are not limited to economic
losses either. In one case a group of farmers sought relief for a loss in crop
yields from the environmental effects of a conspiracy to eliminate research and
development of motor vehicle air pollution equipment. See California v. Auto-
mobile Mfr. Ass'n (In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31), 481
F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). The farmers were de-
nied standing under § 4 because they were not within the target area of the al-
leged violation. Id. at 129-30.
12. See Alioto & Donnici, Standing Requirements for Antitrust Plaintiffs:
Judicially Created Exceptions to a Clear Statutory Policy, 4 U.S.F.L. REV. 205,
206-07 (1970); Berger & Bernstein, supra note 10, at 810-11; Lytle & Purdue,
supra note 10, at 798.
13. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972) (duplica-
tive recoveries); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp.
907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956) (windfall recoveries).
14. See, e.g., Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir. 1982);
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burden of enforcing the antitrust laws.15 Because the Supreme
Court, prior to Blue Shield, had refused to prescribe a single
approach for determining standing,16 the circuit courts devel-
oped their own approaches to the standing problem.' 7
1. The Direct Injury Test
The "direct injury" rule grew out of Loeb v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co., 18 in which the Third Circuit denied standing to a
stockholder of a corporation allegedly injured by the defend-
ant's monopolization of the photographic industry, because his
injury was an indirect consequence of the violation directed at
the corporation.19 Some courts have interpreted the direct in-
Calderone Enterprises v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). In Calderone Enterprises the
Second Circuit reasoned:
If the antitrust laws were precise and crystallized something might be
said in favor of such an enormous expansion of potential treble damage
liability, speculative as the damages might be. But the fact remains
that because there are few "bright lines" in the area, even experts...
often find it impossible to advise a client with any degree of certainty
whether his contemplated conduct will transgress lawful bounds.
15. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746-47 (1977); Loeb v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
16. The Supreme Court has continually admonished the lower federal
courts to avoid unduly burdening plaintiffs in antitrust actions. See, e.g., Radi-
ant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961) (per
curiam) ('Therefore, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted... alle-
gations adequate to show a violation and, in a private treble damage action,
that plaintiff was damaged thereby are all the law requires."); Radovich v. Na-
tional Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957) ("[T]his Court should not add
requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth
by Congress in those laws."); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crys-
tal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948) ('The statute does not confine its protec-
tion to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers .... The
Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made
victims of the forbidden practices . . . ."). See also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 337-45 (1979) ("business or property" should be read broadly, to
include consumers). The Court has recognized, however, that there must be
some limitation on the availability of treble damages under § 4. See, e.g., Illi-
nois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 744-46 (1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251, 262-63 n.14 (1972).
17. See generally Klingsberg, Bull's Eyes and Carom Shots: Complications
and Conflicts on Standing to Sue and Causation Under Section 4 of the Clayton
Ac 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 351 (1971); Note, Standing to Sue in Private Antitrust
Litigation: Circuits in Conflic 10 IND. L. REv. 532 (1977).
18. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
19. Id. at 709. The court reasoned that § 7 of the Sherman Act had to be
construed in light of the prior common law which would have given a cause of
action to the corporation alone:
We have no reason to suppose, much less to assume, that [§ 7 of the
Sherman Act] was intended ... to run contrary to the settled policy of
the law. Such an assumption would require us to believe that the act
was intended, among other things, to multiply suits. Certainly it is not
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jury rule as requiring the plaintiff to be in privity with the anti-
trust defendant.20 Most courts, however, have rejected this
approach and have included competitors and various other cat-
egories of plaintiffs on the basis of earlier cases in which these
plaintiffs were held to have standing.2 1 Under this approach,
courts have denied standing to suppliers of injured custom-
ers,22 licensors of injured licensees, 23 franchisors of injured
franchisees,24 employees of injured employers,25 lessors of in-
jured lessees, 26 and stockholders of injured corporations. 27
The Supreme Court appears to have adopted the direct in-
jury rule to preclude treble damage recoveries by indirect pur-
chasers in a chain of distribution. In Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois,28 the Court held that an indirect purchaser could not
maintain a treble damage action against an antitrust violator on
the theory that the direct purchaser had passed on the viola-
apparent that the act was intended to or did confer upon hundreds or
thousands of stockholders individual rights of action when their
wrongs could have been equally well and far more economically re-
dressed by a single suit in the name of a corporation.... There must
exist some barrier which will effectually prevent such a multiplicity of
suits as the plaintiffs position suggests.
Id.
20. See, e.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383,
395 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237
F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1956).
21. See generally Berger & Bernstein, supra note 10, at 820-30.
22. See, e.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383,
395 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc.
v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956).
23. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 407 F.2d 166, 170-71 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969); Productive Inventions v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224
F.2d 678, 679 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956); Field Productions,
Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aFd, 432 F.2d
1010 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971).
24. See, e.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 189 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
25. See, e.g., Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394, 397 (10th Cir. 1979);
Riebert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 938 (1973); Deaktor v. Fox Grocery Co., 332 F. Supp. 536, 541 (W.D. Pa.
1971), affd, 475 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); Centanni v.
T. Smith & Son, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 330, 338 (E.D. La.), affid, 323 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.
1963); Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299, 302-03 (D.
Mass.), affid, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957); Walder v.
Paramount Publix Corp., 132 F. Supp. 912, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
26. See, e.g., Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518, 519 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956); Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F.
Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953), affd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
828 (1954).
27. See, e.g., Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394, 397 (10th Cir. 1979); Mar-
tens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1957).
28. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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tor's overcharge. 29 The Court reasoned that the risk of duplica-
tive recovery was too great to permit both direct and indirect
purchasers to claim damages from a single overcharge on the
basis of how much each had absorbed.30 Similarly, the Court
has denied treble damages to a state that claimed damage to its
economy as a result of an antitrust violation on the ground that
such damage merely reflected the injury to the business and
property of the state's citizens for which the citizens might
recover.31
2. The Target Area Test
Under the most frequently quoted formulation of the target
area test, a plaintiff "must show that he is within that area of
the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competi-
tive conditions in a particular industry."32 To have standing
under this formulation, some courts require that the plaintiff be
a party against whom the alleged violation was aimed, or a
party within the "target area."33 For example, in Conference of
Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 34 the Ninth Circuit held that a la-
bor union and its members were not within the target area of
an alleged conspiracy between the major motion picture com-
panies and another union.35 The companies had agreed to hire
the conspiring union's members in return for which the latter
were to hire themselves out to the smaller motion picture com-
29. Id. at 746-47.
30. Id. at 737-47. The Court concluded:
On balance, and until there are clear directions from Congress to the
contrary, we conclude that the legislative purpose in creating a group
of "private attorneys general" to enforce the antitrust laws under § 4,
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. at 262, is better served by
holding direct purchasers to be injured to the full extent of the over-
charge paid by them than by attempting to apportion the overcharge
among all that may have absorbed a part of it.
Id. at 746.
31. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264-66 (1972). Congress re-
sponded to the decision in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. by amending § 4 to allow
suits by states as parens patriae, but the statute requires that the courts be
careful to avoid duplicative recoveries. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
32. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
33. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975);
California v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n (In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution),
481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Calderone Enter-
prises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221
F.2d 358, 362-64 (9th Cir. 1955).
34. 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
35. Id. at 54-55.
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panies for supracompetitive wages. The court reasoned that
the plaintiff labor union and its members were not within the
target area because the alleged conspiracy was aimed at de-
stroying the small motion picture companies, not the plaintiff
union or its members.36
Although the target area test often produces the same re-
sults as the direct injury rule,37 the Ninth Circuit has signifi-
cantly broadened the potential scope of the former test by
defining the target area as including all those to whom injury
could be reasonably foreseen as a consequence of the viola-
tion.38 Thus, the Ninth Circuit granted standing to a plaintiff
36. Id. at 52-54. Elaborating on the requirement that injuries flow from
harm to the competitive situation in the industry, the court stated-
Any restraint on commercial competition would occur in the produc-
tion of motion pictures and we fail to see how the appellants are in a
position to complain about that situation. They are not in the business
of producing motion pictures; they do not exhibit motion pictures; they
neither compete with the [defendants] nor purchase from them. In
fact, they are not employees of the companies whom it is alleged the
appellees intend to destroy.
Id. at 54. The last sentence in the quoted material is interesting, for if the court
were to grant standing on the basis of the plaintiffs' employment with the in-
jured businesses, it would extend standing beyond the scope of the direct in-
jury rule.
37. See, e.g., Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1296 (2d Cir. 1971) (nonoperating lessor of movie theatre de-
nied standing because not in target area of block booking scheme), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 930 (1972); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.
1970) (nominally applying the target area test, court denied a franchisor stand-
ing to sue a competitor of an injured franchisee), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923
(1971); Field Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87, 88
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("[T] he injury which plaintiff suffered must have been direct
rather than incidental. Plaintiff must have been in the 'target area' of the al-
leged violation."), affd 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970). The congruence of results
and the lack of distinction between the target area test and the direct injury
test by some courts is explicable because the target area test was originally
conceived as a method of defining which injuries were sufficiently direct to
meet the direct injury rule. See Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d
358, 363 (9th Cir. 1955); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51,
54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). The target area test has
generally been less restrictive than the direct injury rule. See generally Note,
supra note 17.
38. This foreseeability approach developed from language in Karseal Corp.
v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955), where the court concluded
that the plaintiff "was not only hit, but was aimed at" by the defendant. Id. at
365. The court in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964), stated that that language was not
intended as a requirement that the defendant's purpose or intent must have
been to injure the plaintiff, but "was intended to express the view that the
plaintiff must show that, whether or not then known to the conspirators, plain-
tiff's affected operation was actually in the area which it could reasonably be
foreseen would be affected by the conspiracy." Id. at 220. See also Hoopes v.
Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1967).
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who had sold his interest in certain films to the defendant on a
percentage receipts basis and claimed injury when the defend-
ant block booked the films in packages with less desirable
films.39 The court concluded that the plaintiff "Was within the
area 'which it could reasonably be foreseen would be affected'
by block booking."40
3. The Zone of Interests Test
The Sixth Circuit recently imported the "zone of interests"
test used in administrative law to determine standing to chal-
lenge an agency action.4 1 The leading case employing this test
to determine antitrust standing is Malamud v. Sinclair Oil
Corp., 42 in which the Sixth Circuit held that anyone "arguably
within the zone of interests . . . protected" by the antitrust
laws could maintain a treble damage action under section 4.43
There the court granted standing to a plaintiff gasoline retailer
who alleged lost profits as a result of an exclusive supply con-
tract from which the defendant supplier would not release the
plaintiff.44 Although the court found that the defendant's goal
was to maintain the status quo in the distribution market for
gasoline, it concluded nevertheless that the interest the plain-
tiff sought to vindicate was protected by the antitrust laws.45
39. Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971).
40. Id. at 1076 (quoting Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328
F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964)). The court of appeals
rejected the district court's conclusion that the target area included only com-
petitors of the defendant and customers for the films. Id. at 1076. The Supreme
Court has held that block booking is illegal because of its effects on buyers of
the tied product and on competitors in the market for the tied product. This
lends support to the district court's definition of the target area in Mulvey. The
Supreme Court, however, did not consider the effects of a tying arrangement on
a licensor of the tying product. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45
(1962).
41. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970) ("[Tlhe question of standing . . . concerns . . . the question
whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or con-
stitutional guarantee in question.").
42. 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
43. Id. at 1151 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).
44. Id. at 1151-52.
45. Id. The court defined the zone of interests very broadly by stating
"The antitrust laws were enacted to preserve competition and thereby to pro-
tect the individual plaintiff and the consuming public from the effects of any
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade." Id. at 1152. The court re-
jected the target area and direct injury tests, concluding that those tests were
really being used to decide cases prematurely on the merits rather than to de-
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4. The Balancing Test
The Third Circuit has concluded that section 4 standing
analysis requires "a balancing of competing policy interests,
principally the interest in effective enforcement... against the
interest in avoiding vexatious litigation and excessive liabil-
ity."46 Courts adopting this test follow a case-by-case approach
which focuses on the "factual matrix" and the policy considera-
tions for and against standing in the particular case.47
The Ninth Circuit recently adopted this approach in Ostrofe
v. H.S. Crocker Co., 48 rejecting the target area test that had en-
joyed a long reign in that circuit.49 In Ostrofe, the court permit-
ted a discharged employee who had refused to participate in an
unlawful price fixing conspiracy to maintain a section 4 suit
against his former employer.50 The court concluded that a grant
of standing in this case would promote the enforcement objec-
termine whether the plaintiff had stated a cause of action. "Clearly provided
for under Section 4 is the requirement that any person must have suffered in-
jury at the hands of the defendant before he can bring an action. This prereq-
uisite both defines the real party in interest and satisfies the minimum
criterion established by Article III." Id. at 1149. But the court also conceded
that there should be some room for judicial self-restraint in deciding questions
of standing. "[W]e are in sympathy with the policy of limiting the breadth of
Section 4, by whatever theory, [but] we are equally mindful of the Supreme
Court's admonition that summary judgment 'should be used sparingly...."'
Id. at 1150 (quoting Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473
(1962)).
46. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1982) (footnote
omitted), vacated and remanded, 51 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1983).
47. See, e.g., Mid-West Paper Prod. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d
573, 581-87 (3d Cir. 1979); Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90,
99-100 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materi-
als & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 1976). Professor Handler has sug-
gested that the balancing of factors approach may be the only satisfactory
method of dealing with the problem of standing. See Handler, The Shift from
Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third
Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29-31 (1971). Others have also
formalized this approach. See, e.g., Berger & Bernstein, supra note 10.
48. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982).
49. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
50. 670 F.2d at 1386. On virtually identical facts the Seventh Circuit denied
standing under the target area test. See Bichan v. Chemetron Corp. (In re In-
dustrial Gas Antitrust Litigation), 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982). The court there
found that the terminated employee's "injury did not result from a lack of com-
petition in the labor market. The conspiracy [plaintiff] charges was aimed at
restraining competition in the industrial gas market, causing higher prices for
consumers and potential loss of profits for nonconspiring producers." Id. at 517.
From this finding the court held that only consumers or competitors in the in-
dustrial gas market were in the target area. In sharp contrast to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the Bichan court reasoned that only "this select class of plaintiffs... can
impose the deterrent sting of treble damages at the smallest cost of enforce-
ment." Id. at 520.
1020 [Vol. 67:1011
ANTITRUST INJURY
tive of the statute without creating any of the harms the stand-
ing doctrine was intended to prevent.5 1
B. THE ANTITRUST INiRY DocTmNE
In the 1950's and 1960's, the Supreme Court's standing deci-
sions favored a liberal interpretation of section 4, imposing few
constraints on who could maintain a treble damage action. 52
The relaxation of constraints on standing coincided with an ex-
pansion of substantive antitrust liability under the aegis of the
Warren Court. During this period, the enforcement policy of
the antitrust laws was being applied to protect competitors
from the unfair practices of their rivals.53 Thus, a broad grant
of standing furthered the dual objectives of protecting the com-
petitors who were thought to be the principal beneficiaries of
the antitrust laws and of encouraging private enforcement of
those laws.54
The focus of the antitrust laws, however, has shifted under
the Burger Court to a recognition that the antitrust laws are in-
tended to promote economic efficiency.55 The emphasis on effi-
51. 670 F.2d at 1384-86. The court found a number of factors in favor of
granting standing to the discharged employee: covert conspiracies may go un-
detected unless insiders such as employees are allowed to sue; enforcement
objectives would be furthered by granting standing to discharged employees
because liability would thereby be enhanced for unlawful conduct which is
both common and necessary for the successful operation of the conspiracy
granting standing to the discharged employee may help to mitigate or prevent
ultimate injury to others; and the injury in this case flows immediately from
the violation-there is no more proximate victim. Id. Furthermore, none of the
factors ordinarily justifying a restriction of standing was found in this case.
There was no threat of a flood of litigation; there was no threat of potentially
ruinous financial burden on the industry; there was no danger of duplicative re-
coveries; because price fixing is a per se violation, the defendant was not an un-
wary victim of the vagueness of antitrust laws; damages were not speculative
or hard to calculate; and there was no danger of a windfall recovery. Id. The
court defended its use of the "balancing of factors" approach by noting that the
other tests have led to inconsistent and unpredictable results, and although the
other tests may be useful in clear cases, the difficult cases require considera-
tion of all the competing policies. Id.
52. See supra note 17. See also Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 488 (1968) (eliminating as a defense the argument that the
plaintiff had "passed on" an illegal overcharge and thus suffered no injury);
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-40 (1968)
(eliminating the defense of in pari delicto).
53. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364
U.S. 656 (1961); Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
54. Page, supra note 8, at 467-68.
55. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
441 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1979) (blanket licensing of musical compositions justified be-
cause radio and television had changed market conditions so blanket licensing
was necessary to achieve efficiencies); National Soc. of Prof. Eng'rs v. United
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ciency has led the Court to acknowledge that the purpose of
the antitrust laws is to protect competition, rather than to sub-
sidize inefficient competitors.5 6 In keeping with the new focus
of the substantive law the Court has also begun to alter the
procedural law to maintain consistency with the efficiency ob-
jective of the antitrust laws.57
In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 58 the Court re-
jected the idea that any loss causally related to the violation
was recoverable under section 4. Otherwise, the Court rea-
soned, antitrust recovery would be divorced from the purposes
of the antitrust laws.5 9 In vacating the damage award in Bruns-
wick, the Court held that the plaintiffs' damage must flow from
the anticompetitive aspects of the defendant's acts. 60 The facts
of the case clarify the Court's holding. Brunswick, one of the
nation's two largest manufacturers of bowling equipment, ac-
quired a number of defaulting bowling centers, six of which
were in competition with the plaintiffs' centers. The plaintiffs
brought suit, alleging that the acquisitions violated section 7 of
the Clayton Act, on the theory that, because of the defendant's
size, it had the capacity to drive smaller competitors out of the
market, thereby substantially lessening competition. 61 The
plaintiffs claimed damages for the lost profits they would have
made had the defendant not acquired and operated the default-
ing centers.62
In the trial court, the judge instructed the jury in accord-
ance with the plaintiffs' theory of the nature of the violation
and the basis of damages.6 3 The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiffs and awarded the damages claimed. On appeal the
States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (rule of reason "focuses directly on the chal-
lenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions"); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977) ("Competitive economies have so-
cial and political as well as economic advantages .... but an antitrust policy
divorced from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks.").
56. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)
("The antitrust laws, however, were enacted for 'the protection of competition,
not competitors.' ") (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320
(1962). See also Page, supra note 8, at 468.
57. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477
(1977).
58. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
59. Id. at 486-87.
60. Id. at 489.
61. Id. at 480-81.
62. Id. at 481.
63. NBO Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 364 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 523 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nom Bruns-
wick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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Third Circuit endorsed the plaintiffs' legal theory, reasoning
that "a giant [in] a market of pygmies. can resort to low or
below cost sales to sustain itself against competition for a
longer period. ... 64 Although the court of appeals remanded
the case to the trial court to take evidence on whether the bow-
ling centers would have failed if the defendant had not ac-
quired them, it did not object to the plaintiffs' method of
calculating damages.65
On petition to the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall, writing
for a unanimous Court, reversed the lower courts on the issue
of damages. 66 Justice Marshall wrote that every merger,
whether lawful or unlawful, causes some economic dislocation.
He noted that Congress did not condemn all mergers, but only
those that may produce anticompetitive effects. 67 Since this
merger was unlawful because of Brunswick's capacity to
finance predatory conduct out of its "deep pocket," he reasoned
that the plaintiffs' loss must be shown to have been related to
the "deep pocket" rationale upon which the substantive viola-
tion rested.68 In this case, Marshall noted, it was not, since the
plaintiffs would have suffered identical injury had a "shallow
pocket" parent acquired the defaulting centers.69
Marshall observed that not only was the injury not related
to the substantive basis for liability, but an award of damages
based on the injury claimed would be "inimical to the pur-
poses" of the antitrust laws.70 The lost profits claimed by the
plaintiffs were profits they would have earned had the acquired
centers dropped out of the market. In other words, they were
profits that would have been earned as the result of a reduction
in competition. Marshall concluded that, to recover treble
damages,
[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from
that which makes defendant's acts unlawful. The injury should reflect
the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive
acts made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be "the type of
64. NBO Indus. Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 268
(3d Cir. 1975).
65. Id. at 275-77.
66. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487 (1977).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 487-88 ("[W]hile respondents' loss occurred 'by reason of' the un-
lawful acquisitions, it did not occur 'by reason of' that which made the acquisi-
tions unlawful."). Id. at 488.
70. Id.
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loss that the claimed violations ... would be likely to cause."
7 1
As Part II demonstrates, it has proven easier to state this
rule than to apply it. Courts have wrestled with the concept of
antitrust injury for six years without much success. Because
Brunswick was ostensibly a case involving damages, not stand-
ing, the relationship between antitrust injury and standing was
not clear.72 Furthermore, Brunswick was brought under sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act, leaving open the question whether
the antitrust injury doctrine might have application to other
provisions of the antitrust laws as well.73 The Supreme Court's
recent decision in Blue Shield v. McCready, 74 however, should
resolve any doubt, to the extent any remained, that failure to
allege antitrust injury will prove fatal to establishing standing
to sue for treble damages, regardless of which section of the an-
titrust laws allegedly has been violated.75
II. TOWARD A THEORY OF ANTITRUST INJURY BASED
ON LEGAL CAUSE
This Part traces the development of the antitrust doctrine
from Brunswick to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Blue
Shield v. McCready.7 6 It then notes the relationship between
antitrust injury and the efficiency rationale of the antitrust
laws. Finally, a theory of antitrust injury based on legal cause
will be examined.
71. Id. at 489 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S.
100, 125 (1969)) (emphasis in original).
72. Compare Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 888
(5th Cir. 1982) (holding antitrust injury is not an essential element of standing
because "Brunswick is not a standing case. In Brunswick the Supreme Court
was reversing a jury's award of damages after a full trial on the merits."), va-
cated and remanded, 51 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1983), with Chrysler Corp.
v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1234 (6th Cir.) (holding antitrust injury is an
essential element of standing because "[i]f the failure to prove cognizable dam-
ages requires a judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict,.. . it
follows that a failure to allege cognizable damages compels the dismissal of the
complaint"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981).
73. See Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrine: An Unprece-
dented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 979, 992 n.76 (1977).
74. 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).
75. Id. at 2550-51. See also Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 454 F. Supp.
847, 851-52 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (holding that the antitrust injury doctrine applies to
all suits for treble damages under § 4, regardless of the substantive provision
allegedly violated). The antitrust injury doctrine also applies to suits brought
for injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). See
Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210-11 (3d Cir.
1980).
76. 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).
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A. JUDICIAL EFFORTS TO DEFINE ANTITRUST INJURY
1. The Lower Federal Courts
The decisions in the lower courts concerning what consti-
tutes antitrust injury can be divided into two categories. Most
courts have read Brunswick as requiring a plaintiffs injury to
flow from or be caused by the anticompetitive effects of the de-
fendant's acts.7 7 These courts interpret this requirement as re-
stricting the treble damage remedy to consumers or
competitors in the area of the economy endangered by the de-
fendant's acts. Thus, in Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 78 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that an employee discharged for his failure to
assist in the implementation of a price fixing scheme could not
recover treble damages from his employer.7 9 The court found
that the alleged price fixing conspiracy was aimed at control-
ling the price of gas in the industrial gas market.80 Since the
plaintiffs injury was not caused by the anticompetitive effect of
the conspiracy in the industrial gas market, the court reasoned
that the plaintiff had not sustained antitrust injury.81 Similarly,
the Seventh Circuit has held that a defendant's exclusive dis-
tributor could not maintain a treble damage action because the
distributor was forced to absorb a five percent discount defend-
77. See, e.g., California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International Business
Mach. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1979).
[T]he plaintiff must prove not only injury causally linked to the as-
serted violation, but also that the injury is of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent .... Satisfying the latter burden is de-
pendent on a showing that the injury was caused by a reduction ... in
competition flowing from the defendant's acts .... Accordingly, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was intended
to or did have some anticompetitive effect beyond his own loss of busi-
ness or the market's loss of a competitor.
Id. See also General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distribution Co., 681 F.2d
594, 596-97 (9th Cir. 1982); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876,
889 (5th Cir. 1982); Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845, 855 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1981); Midland Telecasting Co. v. Midessa Television Co.,
617 F.2d 1141, 1145 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980); Almeda Mall Inc.
v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 615 F.2d 343, 353-54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 870 (1980); Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 599 F.2d 1299, 1304 (4th Cir.
1979); John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 500 (9th Cir.
1977).
78. 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), appealfiled, 51 U.S.L.W. -.
79. Id. at 517.
80. Id.
81. Id. The court criticized the opinion to the contrary in McNulty v. Bor-
den, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) for "incorrectly focusing on whether
the injury was caused 'by reason of' the anticompetitive behavior rather than,
as Brunswick . . .requires, whether the injury resulted from a lessening of
competition in the affected industry." Id. at 518.
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ant offered to favored customers. 82 According to the court, the
plaintiff suffered no antitrust injury because the plaintiff's in-
jury was not caused by the anticompetitive effect the price dis-
crimination created between favored and nonfavored
customers.8
3
Other courts, however, have not interpreted antitrust in-
jury so narrowly. These courts hold that antitrust injury is sus-
tained not only by consumers and competitors in the area of
the economy endangered by an alleged violation but also by
persons whose injuries facilitated the anticompetitive restraint
or stemmed from conduct in furtherance of the violation.84 In
Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 85 for example,
the district court held that a group of terminated brokers who
were cut off from handling the defendant's products could bring
an action for treble damages against the defendant because
their foreclosure from the market for the defendant's products
facilitated the defendant's plan to control the price and move-
ment of sugar.86 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit permitted an em-
ployee terminated because of his failure to implement a
conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws to recover treble
damages from his employer, although the anticompetitive ef-
fects of the conspiracy did not cause the employee's injury. In
Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 87 the Ninth Circuit held that such a
terminated employee sustained antitrust injury since his injury
was caused by conduct in furtherance of an antitrust viola-
tion.88 The Ostrofe court read Brunswick to require that a
plaintiff's injury "fall within the core of Congressional concern
underlying the substantive provision of the antitrust laws alleg-
edly violated."89
2. Blue Shield v. McCready
Blue Shield squarely confronted the Court with the issue
whether a plaintiff must allege antitrust injury in order to have
82. Lupina v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1169 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied 440 U.S. 982 (1979).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982); Fuchs
Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 447 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd
602 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 917 (1979).
85. 447 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
86. Id. at 878.
87. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982).
88. Id. at 1387.
89. Id. at 1387. The court reasoned that by imposing criminal sanctions
upon individuals who violate the antitrust laws, Congress evidenced its concern
with the conduct of individuals. Id. at 1387-88.
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standing under section 4 in a case not involving section 7 of the
Clayton Act. In Blue Shield, the plaintiff claimed injury as a re-
sult of Blue Shield's practice of refusing to reimburse subscrib-
ers of its group health plan for psychotherapy treatment by
psychologists, while providing reimbursement for comparable
treatment by psychiatrists.90 The plaintiff alleged that Blue
Shield's practice violated section 1 of the Sherman Act because
it was part of a conspiracy between psychiatrists and Blue
Shield "to exclude and boycott clinical psychologists" from par-
ticipation in Blue Shield's plans in order to reduce competition
in the psychotherapy market.9 1 The plaintiff claimed treble
damages for the cost of the services of a psychologist for which
Blue Shield refused to reimburse her in furtherance of the al-
leged conspiracy. 92
Justice Brennan, who authored the majority opinion, wrote
that section 4 standing is denied persons whose injuries are
"too remote" from the alleged antitrust violation.93 To deter-
mine remoteness, Brennan said,
[W]e look (1) to the physical and economic nexus between the alleged
violation and the harm to the plaintiff, and, (2) more particularly, to the
relationship of the injury alleged with those forms of injury about
which Congress was likely to have been concerned in making defend-
ant's conduct unlawful and in providing a private remedy under § 4.94
Justice Brennan reasoned that the plaintiff's injury was not
too remote under the first prong of his test, since the denial of
reimbursement to the plaintiff and her class "was a necessary
step in effecting the ends of the illegal conspiracy," so that the
type of loss claimed was "clearly foreseeable."95 Turning to the
second prong of his test, Brennan focused on whether the
90. 102 S. Ct. at 2542.
91. Id. at 2544.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2547. Besides the remoteness limitation on standing, the Court
noted that under illinois Brick and Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., courts must
limit standing to avoid the imposition of duplicative recoveries. Id. at 2546.
This limitation was irrelevant in Blue Shield because neither McCready's em-
ployer, who purchased the plan, nor her psychologist had been injured by Blue
Shield's refusal to reimburse McCready.
94. Id. at 2548.
95. Id. at 2549. Brennan further commented that "there can be no question
but that the loss was precisely 'the type of loss that the claimed violations...
would be likely to cause." Id. (quoting Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489). Brennan
also used the classic formulation of the target area test to argue that, as a con-
sumer of psychotherapy covered under the plan, "McCready was 'within that
area of the economy... endangered by [the] breakdown of competitive condi-
tions' resulting from Blue Shield's selective refusal to reimburse." 102 S. Ct. at
2549 (quoting California v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n (Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution, M.JD. No. 31), 481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir. 1973)).
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plaintiff sustained antitrust injury. The defendant argued that
the plaintiff did not sustain antitrust injury because her loss
was not the result of any reduction in competition in the psy-
chotherapy market caused by the alleged boycott.96 Brennan,
however, rejected the defendant's argument, finding Brunswick
distinguishable because there the loss claimed depended upon
an increase in competition, whereas McCready's claim was not
so dependent.97 Moreover, Brennan observed that antitrust in-
jury is not limited to injuries that "'reflect the anticompetitive
effect' of the alleged violation."98 Rather, Brennan read Bruns-
wick as merely requiring that a plaintiff's injury be "of a type
that Congress sought to redress in providing a private remedy
for violations of the antitrust laws."99 He concluded that Mc-
Cready's injury was of such a type, since it was a "consequence
of Blue Shield's attempt to pursue" an anticompetitive
scheme.100
Brennan's majority opinion clearly vindicates those courts
that have interpreted the concept of antitrust injury broadly to
include persons injured as a result of conduct in furtherance of
an antitrust violation as well as consumers and competitors in
the restrained market.'0 The opinion explicitly rejects the
view that antitrust injury is confined to those injuries caused
by the anticompetitive effect of the defendant's violation. 0 2
96. 102 S. Ct. at 2549-50.
97. Id. at 2550.
98. Id. In concluding that anticompetitive effects need not be shown in
every case Brennan relied on footnote 14 of the Brunswick opinion, which
states in part-
This does not necessarily mean.., that § 4 plaintiffs must prove an ac-
tual lessening of competition in order to recover. The short term effect
of certain anticompetitive behavior-predatory below-cost pricing, for
example-may be to stimulate price competition. But competitors may
be able to prove antitrust injury before they actually are driven from
the market and competition is thereby lessened.
429 U.S. at 489 n.14.
99. 102 S. Ct. at 2550. He also characterized Brunswick "as embracing the
general principle that treble-damages recoveries should be linked to the pro-
competition policy of the antitrust laws." Id.
100. Id. at 2551. Elaborating on the relationship of McCready's injury to the
anticompetitive scheme, Brennan found that her injury was "inextricably inter-
twined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict on psychologists and
the psychotherapy market." Id. Either the psychologists were injured when
subscribers yielded to Blue Shield's coercive pressure, or the subscribers were
injured by paying a higher net charge for psychologists' services. Thus, the ma-
jority characterized the plan as offering a "Hobson's choice" to subscribers of
"visiting a psychologist and forfeiting reimbursement, or receiving reimburse-
ment by forgoing treatment by the practitioner of their choice." Id.
101. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
102. 102 S. Ct. at 2550.
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Brennan's conclusion, however, that the Brunswick rationale
was based on the fact that the injury complained of arose out of
the procompetitive aspects of the violation misses the main
point of the antitrust injury doctrine.103 The actual basis of the
Brunswick decision was that the alleged injury was unrelated
to the substantive theory upon which liability was based.104 As
the Brunswick Court noted, the plaintiff's injury was not re-
lated to the "deep pocket" rationale which made the merger an-
ticompetitive.105 Whether injury not flowing from an
anticompetitive aspect of a defendant's conduct actually flows
from a procompetitive aspect or a neutral one is immaterial to
the determination that no antitrust injury has occurred under
the Brunswick rationale. By not focusing antitrust injury anal-
ysis on the anticompetitive aspects of the violation, the Blue
Shield majority risked divorcing antitrust damages from the ef-
ficiency rationale of the antitrust laws.
B. AN'rrmusT IN-URY AND ECONoMc EFFICIENCY
When economists speak of "efficiency" as the goal of the
antitrust laws, they mean the goal of maximizing society's wel-
fare through the use of its scarce resources. 106 The antitrust
laws are often said to be chiefly concerned with allocative effi-
ciency, 107 or the extent to which society's resources are allo-
cated to produce the combination of outputs that will maximize
the aggregate welfare of individuals in society. 0 8 Conse-
quently, the antitrust laws favor perfectly competitive markets,
since they produce an optimal allocation of resources among
103. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
105. 429 U.S. at 487-88.
106. See D. NEEDHAM, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE 138
(1969).
107. Besides allocative efficiency, economists frequently cite other eco-
nomic goals for society. One is an equitable distribution of income. Monopoly
is often criticized because it results in a wealth transfer from consumers to pro-
ducers. Economists usually ignore this consequence of monopoly, however,
since there is no basis to determine for which group the marginal utility of in-
come is greater. See, e.g, F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECO-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 460 (2d ed. 1980).
Another economic goal is technical efficiency. Technical efficiency refers to
the cost in terms of society's resources of producing any given output. Econo-
mists, when drawing their diagrams, assume that each firm operates at its low-
est possible cost curve in order to maximize profits. There is some debate
among economists, however, regarding the accuracy of this assumption in the
case of more concentrated industries in which competition is minimal. See id.
at 464-65.
108. D. NEEDHAM, supra note 106, at 138.
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competing outputs. Allocative efficiency is achieved in a per-
fectly competitive equilibrium because the marginal utility de-
rived from the last item produced is equal to its marginal
cost. 0 9 Such an equilibrium is efficient in the Pareto sense in
that no change in the allocation of society's resources to make
more of one good and less of another is capable of making
some members of the community better off without making
anyone worse off.110
On the other hand, the bane of the antitrust laws is monop-
oly. A monopolist restricts output to a level at which price ex-
ceeds marginal cost."' Consequently, the marginal benefit to
society of the unproduced output exceeds its marginal cost.112
Resources that would otherwise be used in the production of
109. This conclusion assumes that the marginal benefit to society as a whole
is the same as the marginal benefit, or marginal utility, to the purchaser of the
last unit of output. Similarly, perfect competition achieves allocative efficiency
only if the social marginal cost of producing the last unit of output equals the
marginal cost to producers.
110. In a perfectly competitive equilibrium, the rate at which society can
transform one good into another would coincide with the rate at which each
consumer would be willing to exchange that good for the other. Assume, for
example, a society with only two goods, pencils and pens. If consumers are
willing to give up one pen only if they receive two pencils, and producers can
produce one more pen only if they use the inputs required to produce the last
two pencils, the society will have achieved the Pareto optimal output. At this
output, society cannot make anyone better off without making someone else
worse off, since an attempt to help one consumer by giving him or her an addi-
tional pen would result in two fewer pencils for other consumers. See D. NEED-
HAM, supra note 106, at 140-41.
111. A monopolist maximizes profits by producing at an output that equates
marginal revenue with marginal cost. Because a monopolist's marginal reve-
nue does not equal price, the output level of a monopolist will not correspond
to that point where marginal cost equals price as it does for a perfectly compe-
titive firm. As the figure below illustrates, the monopolist produces at an out-
put of Q and charges a price of P.
Price
P -
I MC
MR d
Q Quantity
Figure 1
See E. MANSFIELD, MCROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPICATONS 288-89 (4th ed.
1982).
112. See P. WONNACOTr & R. WONNACOTr, ECONOMCs 464-65 (1979).
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the monopolized product are thus diverted to producing other
goods that are less valuable to society. The resulting allocation
of resources is not efficient in the Pareto sense, since some
members of society could be made better off without harm to
anyone by shifting resources from the production of the less
desirable goods to the production of the monopolized
product." 3
The social cost of monopoly can be described, then, as the
efficiency loss associated with the monopolist's restriction of
supply, usually referred to as "deadweight loss."114 Under mo-
nopoly conditions, consumers' willingness to pay for the lost
output outweighs the cost of producing that output, as illus-
trated by the so-called "welfare triangle."" 5 This loss, however,
is not imposed on any particular, identifiable segment of soci-
113. Because the ratios of marginal cost and price between two products
will not be equal if one, but not the other, of the products is produced by a mo-
nopolist, the rate at which society can transform one good into another will not
correspond to the rate at which consumers would be willing to exchange that
good for the other. See D. NEEDHAM, supra note 106, at 149. Consequently, it
will be possible to make some members of society better off without making
anyone worse off by shifting resources from the production of the competitively
priced good to the production of the good priced above marginal cost. See id. at
150.
114. See F. SCHERER, supra note 107, at 460.
115. The following diagram illustrates the net welfare loss due to monopoly
output restriction. If an industry were competitively structured, price would
equal Pc and output would be Qd. If the industry were monopolized, price
would rise to Pm and output would decrease to Qrh. Consumer surplus, which
was area PICPO in perfect competition, is reduced by PmBCPc. The consumer
surplus in rectangular area PmBAPc is transferred to the monopolist in the
form of monopoly profit, but area ABC is lost to consumers under monopoly
and is not captured by the monopolist. It therefore represents the net welfare
loss attributable to the monopoly.
Price
Pq
Pc B
Qm Qc Quantity
Figure 2
See E. MANsFIELD, supra note 111, at 292; F. ScHERER, supra note 107, at 459-60.
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ety. Instead, society as a whole suffers as a result of the failure
to produce the combination of outputs that consumers want." 6
If allocative efficiency were the only concern of the anti-
trust laws, the treble damage remedy would not make much
sense, for as economic theory teaches, everyone suffers the ef-
fects of a monopoly. Since Congress could not be expected to
have conferred such a right on every member of society, there
must be some limitation on the availability of the treble dam-
age remedy. Such a limitation is not provided, however, by de-
fining antitrust injury as the loss attributable to the allocative
inefficiency caused by a defendant's anticompetitive practices.
This cannot be what the Brunswick Court meant by requiring
that a plaintiff's injury flow from the anticompetitive effects of
the violation."7
C. A CAUSATION APPROACIT TO ANTITRUST INJURY
As the previous section demonstrates, interpreting Bruns-
wick as requiring that a plaintiffs injury be caused by the an-
ticompetitive effect of the defendant's conduct-if
anticompetitive effect is taken to mean the efficiency loss re-
sulting from the defendant's acts-would render the treble
damage remedy ineffective to achieve its purposes. Thus, the
search for Brunswick's meaning must turn elsewhere. This
Note suggests that the concept of legal cause as used in the law
of negligence is useful in determining when a plaintiff has suf-
fered antitrust injury.
1. Legal Cause in the Law of Negligence
Commentators have frequently recognized that antitrust
standing requires not only causation in fact but also legal cau-
sation between the defendant's acts and the plaintiff's injury." 8
In Brunswick, the Court rejected the idea that any injury
"causally linked" to a defendant's violation constitutes anti-
trust injury."9 To understand antitrust standing, then, one
must understand the inherently ambiguous term, "proximate
cause."
Courts have imposed a proximate cause requirement on
the recoverability of damages caused by a person's negligence
in order to confine liability for negligent conduct within reason-
116. See P. WONNACOTr & R. WONNACOTr, supra note 112, at 464.
117. See supra text accompanying note 71.
118. See, e.g., Berger & Bernstein, supra note 10, at 810-11.
119. 429 U.S. at 487.
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able bounds. Although the term is not free from controversy,
the most common view is that liability for negligence is re-
stricted to the scope of the original risk created by the con-
duct.12 0 Under this formulation, the test that determines the
extent of liability is the same as the test that determines
whether the conduct is negligent in the first place.12' It is often
said, therefore, that liability for negligence is limited to the
"foreseeable" or "natural and probable" consequences of an
act.' 22 That is, the harm complained of must flow from the par-
ticular risk that made the conduct unreasonable. 23
Professor Keeton explained this concept of proximate
cause, which he called the "Risk Rule," as follows: "A negligent
actor is legally responsible for that harm, and only that harm,
of which the negligent aspect of his conduct is a cause in
fact."'1 24 Keeton observed that an actor's conduct could be a
cause of harm of which his or her negligence was not.' 25 To il-
lustrate his point, he discussed an example in which the propri-
etor of a restaurant places an unlabelled can of rat poison next
to some cans of flour on a shelf near a stove. While the proprie-
tor's negligence consisted of placing poison in a place where
someone could mistake it for flour, the victim was killed when
the poison exploded from the heat of the stove. Keeton argued
that the proprietor's negligence was not the cause of the vic-
tim's death, since "it cannot be said that the harm of death
from explosion would not have occurred but for defendant's
placing the poison where it was likely to be mistaken for some-
thing intended for human consumption."' 26 The victim's injury
would have been identical even if the can of poison had been
labelled and not placed next to the cans of flour. Thus, al-
120. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (4th
ed. 1971).
121. Id. at 251.
122. See, e.g., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1876).
123. In Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928),
Judge Cardozo reformulated the rule in the text in terms of the foreseeability
of harm to the person actually injured. This is usually expressed as the "fore-
seeable plaintiff"' rule. Cardozo added a further limitation which required that
the injury that occurred affect the particular interest threatened by defendant's
negligence. See id. at 346-47, 162 N.E. at 101. This is similar to the rule uni-
formly applied where a defendant's negligence is based on the violation of a
statute. In such cases, courts require that the plaintiff be within the class of
persons protected by the statute and that the harm suffered be the kind the
statute sought to prevent. See W. PROSSER, supra note 120, § 36.
124. R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE iN THE LAW OF TORT 9 (1963) (emphasis in
original).
125. Id. at 5.
126. Id. at 6.
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though the proprietor's conduct of placing the poison near heat
was a cause in fact of the victim's death, the proprietor is not
liable because that aspect of the proprietor's conduct which
made it negligent-placing the poison where it could be mis-
taken for flour-was not a cause in fact of the victim's injury.
The language of Brunswick seems to require a similar dis-
tinction between the defendant's conduct and that which
makes it unlawful in determining whether a plaintiff's loss is
antitrust injury.127 The problem remaining to be resolved, then,
is to identify that which makes an antitrust violation unlawful.
2. Applying Legal Cause to Antitrust Law
Once one identifies the unlawful aspect of an antitrust vio-
lator's conduct, one need ask only whether it was a cause in
fact of the plaintiff's injury in order to determine whether the
plaintiff suffered antitrust injury. Professor Page has suggested
defining the unlawful aspect of an antitrust violator's conduct
as that aspect of the conduct that causes economic ineffi-
ciency. 2 8 Page argues that, for example, below-cost pricing
causes output to expand to a point where the marginal cost of
the last units produced exceeds consumers' willingness to pay
for the output. 2 9 The lower price causes consumers to substi-
tute the predatorily priced goods for goods produced by the
127. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
128. Page, supra note 8, at 477.
129. The following diagram illustrates the effects of predatory pricing.
Price :
PA BC
1\d
Qc Qp Quantity
Figure 3
The predator's lower price causes industry output to increase from Qc to Qp.
The triangle ABC represents the economic inefficiency, or "deadweight loss," of
predatory pricing. In this area, the marginal cost of production exceeds the
production's value to consumers. See Page, supra note 8, at 484 n.68.
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predator's competitors, causing inefficiency in the allocation of
society's resources.13 0 Page implies, therefore, that competitors
always suffer antitrust injury from predatory pricing, since
their injury flows from that aspect of the violation that creates
inefficiency.
But if the kind of inefficiency described above were the
only effect of predatory pricing, it is doubtful that the antitrust
laws would condemn it. The difference between this kind of
inefficiency and the kind of inefficiency associated with a mo-
nopoly is that in the former the short run interests of predator
and society are the same. Both the predator and society suffer
from below-cost pricing. Society suffers because of the alloca-
tive inefficiency described above, and the predator suffers be-
cause of the wealth transfer from producers to consumers
through the predatory price.131 In a monopoly, wealth is trans-
ferred in the other direction-from consumers to producers.
Thus, if this wealth transfer were the only effect of predatory
pricing, society could rely on the self interest of producers to
avoid it.
The antitrust laws condemn predatory pricing for another
reason, however. If successful, predatory pricing drives com-
petitors out of the market, increasing the predator's market
share so that the predator can subsequently increase price
above marginal cost.132 The real reason, then, for condemning
predatory pricing is that it can extinguish competition, causing
the kind of allocative inefficiency associated with monopoly.13 3
For predation to be successful, however, two conditions must
be present. The predator must have greater financial staying
power than its rivals, and there must be sufficiently high barri-
ers to entry to avoid attracting new entrants. 34 If either condi-
130. The allocative inefficiency of predatory pricing is represented by the
fact that the ratios of marginal cost and price between the predatorily priced
product and a competitively priced product will not be equal. This means that
resources can be shifted from the production of the predatorily priced product
to the production of other goods, to make some members of society better off
without harming anyone. Cf. D. NEEDIA, supra note 106, at 149 (unequal mar-
ginal cost and price ratios between two products implies that resources could
be reallocated to maximize welfare).
131. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act 88 HARv. L. REv. 697, 712 (1975).
132. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking
Co., Inc., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981); Northeastern TeL Co. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981).
133. See Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 857-58
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
134. Areeda & Turner, supra note 131, at 698.
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tion is not met, the object of the predator, to achieve monopoly
profits, cannot be attained. Either the predator will be driven
out of the market itself or it will not be able to maintain a mo-
nopoly price once competitors have been eliminated.
By focusing on the real efficiency loss with which the anti-
trust laws are concerned, the conditions without which the effi-
ciency loss would not occur can be identified. Thus, unless a
predator had superior staying power and there were barriers to
entry, the allocative inefficiency associated with monopoly
would not occur. Such conditions must therefore be a cause in
fact of the plaintiff's injury in order for the plaintiff to incur an-
titrust injury. That is, for a competitor to claim antitrust injury
from predatory pricing it must show that its injury would not
have occurred but for the predator's superior staying power
and high entry barriers. 3 5
It is suggested that this analysis is capable of determining
antitrust injury in other contexts as well. In Blue Shield, for
example, McCready alleged that Blue Shield had engaged in a
conspiracy with psychiatrists to boycott psychologists. 136 The
alleged object of the conspiracy was to capture a greater share
of the psychotherapy market for psychiatrists, presumably so
they could raise the price of psychotherapy treatment above
the competitive price. For the conspiracy to succeed, Blue
Shield would have to possess some sort of economic power
over consumers of medical insurance in order to persuade
them to accept the Blue Shield terms which discriminated
against psychologists. Thus, the appropriate inquiry to deter-
mine whether McCready sustained antitrust injury is to ask
whether her injury, nonreimbursement for the services of a
psychologist, would not have occurred but for Blue Shield's
economic power in the medical insurance market. Although
this inquiry necessitates speculation about what would have
happened in the absence of some condition, it is nonetheless
possible to conclude that McCready's injury would not have oc-
curred unless Blue Shield possessed some economic power to
force consumers to purchase the Blue Shield plan over a rival
135. In the case of predatory pricing, it can probably be assumed that the
competitor's injury would not have occurred in the absence of these conditions,
because for predatory pricing to make sense, the predator must be reasonably
certain of success. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the predator would
not have engaged in nonremunerative pricing unless the conditions essential to
its success were met. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. iT Continental
Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981).
136. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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plan which would have covered a psychologist's services.137
Analyzing legal cause in antitrust cases in these terms sup-
ports Justice Brennan's conclusion that McCready did, in fact,
suffer antitrust injury.
Moreover, this conclusion is consistent with Brunswick's
requirement that the injury be related to the rationale upon
which substantive liability is based, since McCready's injury
flowed from the conditions which were essential to the success-
ful implementation of the 6onspiracy alleged. Put in this light,
other cases might also be solved. Most important, however,
this analysis avoids divorcing antitrust recoveries from the effi-
ciency objective of the antitrust laws.
I. THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST INJURY IN
STANDING ANALYSIS
There remains to be considered whether antitrust injury
alone can define the class of plaintiffs who should be granted
standing to maintain treble damage actions against antitrust vi-
olators. As defined in the previous Part, antitrust injury could
confer standing on a potentially large class, if it were the sole
criterion by which standing were judged.138 In Blue Shield,
Justice Brennan did not rely solely on the antitrust injury doc-
trine to determine McCready's standing. He added the require-
ment that there be a sufficiently close "physical and economic
nexus between the alleged violation and the harm to the plain-
tiff.' '139 Brennan apparently felt that this requirement was met
because harm to the class of which McCready was a member
was clearly "foreseeable" as a consequence of the alleged
conspiracy.140
Brennan's additional foreseeability test, however, does not
impose significant restraints on standing beyond those already
accomplished through the antitrust injury doctrine. In fact,
Brennan's foreseeability limit is simply another way to say that
137. If Blue Shield had no economic power in the medical insurance mar-
ket, consumers who desired coverage for psychologists' services would simply
purchase their medical insurance from a company that provided such coverage
at a comparable price. Without some sort of economic advantage over its rivals,
Blue Shield would be unable to attract such consumers to its medical plan and
coerce them into purchasing their psychotherapy from psychiatrists instead of
psychologists in order to obtain reimbursement. See Note, The Monopolist's Re-
fisal to DeaL An Argument for a Rule of Reason, 59 TEx. I. REv. 1107, 1112
(1981).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 143-44.
139. 102 S. Ct. at 2548.
140. Id. at 2549.
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the unlawful aspect of the defendant's conduct must be a cause
in fact of the plaintiff's injury.141 If standing is to be granted to
a narrower class than those who sustain antitrust injury, an-
other limitation must be found.
Conduct that is capable of producing the efficiency loss the
antitrust laws seek to prevent may set off a sequence of events
capable of injuring innumerable persons as the effects move
through the economy.142 An illegal overcharge, for example, can
be passed on through any number of persons before it is finally
absorbed at the end of a chain of production and distribution.
Thus, it makes sense to impose what may be an arbitrary, but
nevertheless necessary, limit on who among the class of those
sustaining antitrust injury should have standing to recover
treble damages. If standing were granted to all who suffered
antitrust injury, duplicative recoveries could not be prevented,
ruinous financial obligations could be inflicted upon antitrust
violators, and multiple litigation could burden the administra-
tion of the antitrust laws.143
This Note proposes that standing be conferred on those
within the class suffering antitrust injury, as defined above,144
whose injuries flow directly from the efficiency loss caused by a
defendant's conduct or whose injuries occur earlier in the chain
of causation from the defendant's conduct. Thus, on the facts
of Blue Shield, consumers of psychotherapy suffer injury di-
rectly from the efficiency loss, since they are unable to con-
sume as much psychotherapy as they would if it were
competitively priced.145 On the other hand, Blue Shield medi-
cal plan subscribers and psychologists sustain injuries earlier
in the chain of causation, since their injuries are necessary
antecedents to achieving the efficiency loss in the psychother-
apy market. 46
Limiting antitrust recovery as suggested does not interfere
with the purposes of the treble damage remedy, while the dan-
141. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hawaii v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 128-35.
145. Of course, such consumers must first establish injury in fact. See gener-
ally Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARv. L REv.
1127 (1976).
146. Unless subscribers are coerced into obtaining services from psychia-
trists, and psychologists are thereby driven from the market, no inefficiency in
the psychotherapy market would occur. See supra notes 136-37 and accompa-
nying text.
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gers that the standing requirement is intended to prevent are
reduced. This approach insures that the parties most directly
injured by an antitrust violation, and thus those most likely to
prosecute such violations, would be compensated for their inju-
ries, and the punishment imposed on wrongdoers would be
commensurate with their wrongdoing. The danger of duplica-
tive recoveries would be reduced by denying standing to indi-
rect purchasers.147 Moreover, the burden of administering the
antitrust laws would be significantly decreased.
rV. CONCLUSION
This Note proposes a framework for analyzing whether a
particular injury constitutes an antitrust injury for purposes of
section 4 standing. The suggested approach draws on concepts
from tort law that assist in identifying whether a defendant's
violation is the legal cause of a plaintiff's injury. To make this
determination, this Note suggests that courts inquire into the
conditions which are necessary to achieve the efficiency loss
threatened by the defendant's conduct and ask whether the
plaintiff's injury would have occurred but for those conditions.
While this framework will help identify antitrust injury, it
is not sufficient to define the class to which the treble damage
remedy should be available; antitrust injury as so defined will
produce too broad a plaintiff class to be manageable for stand-
ing purposes. Therefore, this Note proposes an additional limi-
tation on standing that would extend it no further than the
level directly affected by the efficiency loss caused by the de-
fendant's conduct. It is hoped that this will clarify the nature of
antitrust injury and its relation to legal cause, as well as iden-
tify its limits in standing analysis.
147. The proposal therefore encompasses the Illinois Brick rule barring re-
covery by indirect purchasers. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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